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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SUBSTANTIVE CONTEXT: THE EXXONVALDEZ CASES

KEITH E. SEALING*
“Lawyers yet to be born will work on this case.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
I am told that many students come into Civil Procedure thinking that the
subject is, first, either the hardest course in the first year or, alternatively, tied
with Property for that honor, and, second, the most boring course in the first
year curriculum. Regardless of whether either of these beliefs is true, Civil
Procedure is clearly the course with which 1Ls have the least familiarity. The
students’ journey to the conclusion that Civil Procedure is not only fascinating,
but vitally important begins on day one. But how to start?
Most Civil Procedure casebooks provide an introductory overview of civil
actions before moving on to topic by topic, in-depth coverage of the material.
There appear to be two basic approaches to this process. In many instances,
the casebooks use a series of short cases to introduce each topic area. For
example, Professor Cound (the casebook I utilize) uses twelve cases,2
Professor Yeazell uses nine3 and Professor Friedman uses six.4 In my view,
the weakness of this approach is that the authors must drastically shorten the
cases used, and many of them are neither particularly important nor interesting.
Further, because of the large amount of material that must be covered in a short
period of time,5 there may be a tendency to move through the cases too
quickly, developing bad habits for first semester students. I prefer to select one
major case of intrinsic interest to begin each of my first year courses.6 I use

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D., 1985, Temple
University School of Law; B.S., 1982, University of Northern Colorado.
1. Unnamed member of the oil industry quoted in J. STEPHEN PICOU ET AL., THE EXXON
VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEM 118 (2d ed. 1999).
2. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2001).
3. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2000).
4. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, ET AL., THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2002).
5. At Syracuse, Civil Procedure is a one-semester, four-credit course.
6. My description of how I use Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d
479 (Cal. 1990), to introduce property law is included in last year’s edition of this annual
symposium dedicated to teaching techniques. See Keith Sealing, Teaching Fundamental
63
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the series of cases that arose from the Exxon Valdez disaster when I teach Civil
Procedure.7
In using only cases arising out of this single event, I attempt to achieve at
least five goals: first, introducing the field of Civil Procedure itself; second,
demonstrating the breadth and complexity of modern civil actions; third,
demonstrating the crucial relationship between procedural and substantive law;
fourth, capturing the students’ interest with a fascinating and timely case; and,
finally, showing my students, who will spend most of their first year reading
shortened, tightly edited casebook appellate opinions, a lengthy, tough, lightly
edited set of “real world” cases.8
As a result of the extensive litigation, the cases yield fruitful discussion of
pleadings, facts and how they are discovered, subject matter jurisdiction,
venue, forum non conveniens, the appeals process, the jury trial, the use of
expert testimony, how evidence is obtained and presented to the jury, the
court’s power to overturn a jury’s decision, class actions and the interests of
various parties, ADR and settlement, the relationship of state and federal law,
and a dose of professional responsibility. I also like to incorporate at least
some discussion of the issues raised by indigenous peoples, and the peculiar
damages caused to Natives living indigenous lifestyles presents this
opportunity.9 By careful reference to various actions, it is possible to include
an introduction to almost every aspect of the civil action that is included in
most casebooks’ introductory chapters.

Learning Techniques with Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
755 (2002).
7. Other similar approaches should be noted. First, I would include Jonathan Harr’s
extensive, reads-like-a-novel coverage of Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988). See
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995), which also includes a companion volume of extensive
(more than eight-hundred pages) documentation; LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN,
A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION (rev. ed. 2002). Second, see NAN HUNTER,
THE POWER OF PROCEDURE: THE LITIGATION OF JONES V. CLINTON (2002), where the author
covers much of the realm of Civil Procedure in slightly under 200 pages. Third, Professors
Silberman and Stein devote forty-one pages to New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(holding that First Amendment limits a state’s power to award damages for libel against a public
official in his official conduct; Alabama libel law unconstitutional; the state law does not survive
merely because it allows truth as a defense, honest error must also be protected). See LINDA J.
SILBERMAN & ALLAN R. STEIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 13-54 (2001).
8. The full text of the most recent case, In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir.
2001), prints out at about 63 pages, including headnotes. I cut down the various excerpts to about
one hundred pages, which I make available for the students to download off Blackboard ©.
9. See Darrin J. Quam, Comment, Right to Subsist: The Alaska Natives’ Campaign to
Recover Damages Caused by the Exxon Valdez Spill, 5 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 177 (1992)
(examining the litigation strategies of the Natives living subsistence lifestyles); Christopher V.
Panoff, Chapter, In Re The Exxon Valdez Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp.: Cultural
Resources, Subsistence Living, and the Special Injury Rule, 28 ENVTL. L. 701 (1998).
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We will cover much that is not Civil Procedure—Torts, Property,
Evidence, Environmental Law, Legislation—but that is not a bad thing. It is
only in law school that the law is divided into neat little compartments.
II. DISCUSSION
The following sections discuss, first, the facts about the Exxon Valdez
disaster, second, the legal proceedings flowing from the event that I use to
introduce Civil Procedure to my students, and, finally, two collateral topics
that I use the cases to introduce: professional responsibility and the rights of
indigenous peoples.
A.

Factual background

Most students are at least marginally familiar with the factual background.
There are a number of useful web sites available, and I instruct my students to
visit them before the first day of class.10 The cases demonstrate to students
that the word “facts” will become for them a term of art and that even in an
event which received as much scrutiny as this one, the facts are always murky.
My handout materials begin with the last (as of this writing) case for its
explication of the facts: In re The Exxon Valdez,11 which begins its discussion
in 1794 with the discovery and naming of Bligh Island and Bligh Reef, the reef
into which the Exxon Valdez crashed.12 Because so much has been written
about the disaster and because virtually all of the crucial facts found in the case
law are disputed, many points can be debated. Students are asked to think
about how lawyers for both sides developed these facts.

10. There are a large number of web sites either devoted to the disaster or else having at least
some material on it. The two I would most recommend are, first, what could be called the
“official” site, that of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council and, second, that of the
Anchorage Daily News. The Trustee Council, created as part of the state and federal settlement,
consists of three federal representatives, the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce and the Interior, and, on the state side, the Commissioners of the Department of
Environmental Conservation and the Department of Fish and Game and the Alaska Attorney
General. The Trustee’s site has a wealth of material including copies of the August 29, 1991,
Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree and the September 30, 1991, Agreement and
Consent Decree as well as downloadable photographs. See http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us (last
visited July 22, 2002). The Anchorage Daily News site includes a very thorough archive of all its
news stories related to the disaster and additional photos. See http://www.adn.com/evos/
index.html (last visited July 22, 2002). See also PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 334-36 (listing
websites available as of 1999).
11. 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001).
12. Id. at 1221. The reef was discovered by Captain George Vancouver, who named it after
Captain William Bligh, later to gain notoriety from Fletcher Christian’s mutiny on his H.M.S.
Bounty. Id. (citing 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (11th ed. 1910)). Ironically, the disaster
occurred on the two-hundredth anniversary of the mutiny. Id.
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Here, in summary form, are the facts as the federal court ultimately found
them. On March 23, 1989, shortly before midnight, the oil tanker Exxon
Valdez left the Alaskan port of Valdez bound for California. The Captain,
Joseph Hazelwood,13 took the ship east of the normal sea lanes to avoid ice.14
Here occurs the first opportunity to teach students about the interpretation of
facts. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Hazelwood acted “prudently” in
avoiding the shipping lane,15 but others have argued that it was a timesaving
measure and that it might have been safer to go slowly through the icy
shipping lane.16 In any case, this put the ship on a course directly towards
Bligh Reef.17 However, Bligh Reef was not difficult to avoid if the ship was
handled properly.18 Nevertheless:
Considering the ice in the water, the darkness, the importance of turning the
vessel away from Bligh Reef before hitting it, and the tricky nature of turning
this behemoth, one would expect an experienced captain of the ship to manage
this critical turn.19

However, Captain Hazelwood did several things wrong at this point. First, he
put the ship, which held more than 53 million gallons of oil20 on autopilot,
which caused it to increase speed and make the turn more difficult.21 Then,
with just two minutes remaining before the crucial turn needed to be executed,
he left the bridge, leaving a less experienced, fatigued22 man in charge.23

13. By all accounts, Hazelwood was an otherwise excellent Captain, who had become the
youngest Captain in Exxon’s fleet at age 32. See JOHN KEEBLE, OUTSIDE THE CHANNEL: THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND (1999).
14. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1222.
15. Id.
16. See KEEBLE, supra note 13. See also ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT,
available at http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us (1990) (abridged version) [hereinafter ALASKA OIL
SPILL COMMISSION].
17. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1222.
18. Id. The mechanics of turning a ship of the Exxon Valdez’s size are illustrated by a
portion of the trial transcript in which expert witness Captain Michael Clark discusses how one
turns a tanker. I leave this portion of the case in my abbreviated version, and also use it as an
opportunity to mention the role of expert witnesses.
19. Id.
20. ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 16.
21. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1223.
22. “If the congressionally mandated requirement that officers have six hours’ off-duty time
within the 12-hour period prior to departure had been adhered to, the Exxon Valdez would never
have cast off that night.” KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 35.
23. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1222-23. This was not merely poor judgment but
also violated the law. A special license is required to navigate the portion of Prince William
Sound which contains Bligh Reef and only Hazelwood of the Exxon Valdez crew held that
license. Id. at 1222. Further, two officers are required to be on the bridge, and, without
Hazelwood, there was only one. Id. at 1223.
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Why? Anyone who is even passingly familiar with the accident will give
the following answer: Hazelwood was drunk. The jury apparently believed
that Hazelwood, who was unquestionably an alcoholic, had quit his Alcoholics
Anonymous program, fallen off the wagon and resumed drinking, and was, to
at least some degree, impaired. “Testimony established that prior to boarding
his ship he drank at least five doubles (about fifteen ounces of 80 proof
alcohol) in waterfront bars in Valdez.”24 Another key fact in the coming
litigation: the highest executives in Exxon Shipping were aware that
Hazelwood had fallen off the wagon and was drinking on board its ships and in
waterfront bars.25 However, the facts are a bit more complicated than this.26
Further, from a publicity perspective, the demonization of Hazelwood tended
to shift the blame away from the oil industry, the governments and the oilhungry consumers.
As a result of Hazelwood’s actions and inactions, the Exxon Valdez
grounded on Bligh Reef and eleven million gallons of oil poured into the
delicate ecosystem of Prince William Sound.27 Ultimately, more than 3,000
square miles were devastated, 250,000 birds and thousands of marine animals
were killed, twenty animal species were affected (many of which have not yet
rebounded), entire fishing communities were affected, fishermen were forced
into bankruptcy and native subsistence communities were disrupted.28
24. Id.
25. Id. After a 1984 arrest for drunk driving, he entered into a rehabilitation program at the
urging of an Exxon supervisor. An Exxon official wrote a memo to the Exxon law department
warning that Hazelwood had admitted to returning to his vessel intoxicated. He resumed heavy
drinking and was arrested a second time for drunken driving. Just two weeks before the accident,
he was seen drinking in San Francisco. KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 39-40.
26. Hazelwood claimed to have had two beers. Hazelwood’s blood alcohol test was not
administered until ten hours after the accident. At that time his blood alcohol content was
0.061%, not high enough for a drunk driving conviction in Alaska but above the Coast Guard’s
0.04 limit for ship operators. At trial it was argued to the jury that this figure meant that
Hazelwood would have had an alcohol level of 0.22% (fall-down drunk) at the time of the
accident, but this analysis did not reflect the fact that Hazelwood could have had drinks after the
accident, but before the delayed test. Two other events further complicated the issue. First, one
investigator reported that Hazelwood had no alcohol in his cabin, but admitted that his search was
incomplete; another first said he saw a bottle of Jack Daniels in Hazelwood’s cabin, but later
admitted that the image may have been in his mind from another event in his life. Second, the
blood samples followed a circuitous route to the lab and may have been misidentified. KEEBLE,
supra note 13, at 38.
27. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1223. The amount of the spill further demonstrates
the Rashamon-like nature of the facts. Keeble argues convincingly that the actual spill amount
was between 23 and 35 million gallons. See KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 59 n.24. See also Lee
Clarke, The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez, in CONTROVERSY: POLITICS OF TECHNICAL DECISIONS
80-96 (3d ed. 1992), reprinted in PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 55, 65 (“Like many official
statistics, the 11 million gallon figure is more ambiguous than appears at first glance.”).
28. Evelyn Nieves, Court Overturns Jury Award in ‘89 Exxon Valdez Spill, N.Y. TIMES,
November 8, 2001, at A14.
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Many factors exacerbated the spill. First, although the Exxon Valdez was
the newest ship in Exxon’s fleet it was a single hull design, despite Alyeska’s
promise that all ships coming into the delicate Prince William Sound
ecosystem would be of double hull construction.29 Second, there were the
alleged delays and incompetence in the clean-up process.30 Who was to
blame? It was more than just the matter of a possibly drunken Captain. As the
State of Alaska put it: “Industry’s insistence on regulating the Valdez tanker
trade its own way, and government’s incremental accession to industry
pressure, had produced a disastrous failure of the system.”31 Then, too, the
unending demand for oil and the environmentally questionable decision to
build the pipeline itself are also fodder for brief class discussion, even if not
Civil Procedure per se.32
29. See KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 21. A double hull could have reduced the spill by 60%.
Id. at 166 n.47 (citing Coast Guard experts). The Clean Water Act of 1972 mandates conversion
to double hulls. The 1990 Oil Pollution Act requires that all new tankers have double hulls and
that existing single hull tankers be retrofitted or taken out of service by 2015. Id. at 310.
30. The Alaska Oil Spill Commission found:
The response capabilities of Alyeska Pipeline Service Company to deal with the spreading
sea of oil would be tested and found to be both unexpectedly slow and woefully
inadequate. The worldwide capabilities of Exxon Corp. would mobilize huge quantities
of equipment and personnel to respond to the spill—but not in the crucial first few hours
and days when containment and cleanup efforts are at a premium. The U.S. Coast Guard
would demonstrate its prowess at ship salvage, protecting crews and lightering operations,
but prove utterly incapable of oil spill containment and response. State and federal
agencies would show differing levels of preparedness and command capability.
ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 16 (emphasis added). The National Response
Team’s Report to the President concluded that neither the government nor any part of the industry
other than Alyeska had planned for a spill of the size that occurred, that Alyeska’s plan was
otherwise inadequate and, in any case, Alyeska did not carry out its plan in a manner that assured
a rapid response and that there were a variety of other inadequacies, such as in training and
equipment availability. NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: A REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT (1989), reprinted in PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 46-47. See also Maurie
Cohen, Economic Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, in PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 133,
136 (“After the supertanker ran aground managerial chaos ensued and emergency-response
personnel were initially unable to mobilize the appropriate oil spill-containment equipment.”).
31. ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 16.
32. The 800-mile long pipeline was pushed by the Nixon Administration following the
1973-74 oil crisis. Critics noted that the pipeline was built through an area known to be the site
of potential earthquakes and ended at environmentally sensitive Prince William Sound.
Alternative plans to pipe the oil through Canada to the United States were given little
consideration. Because the pipeline carries 71 million gallons a day and Valdez has little storage
capacity, 700 to 1100 oil tankers must pass through the Sound each year. The pipeline has never
been shut down and it is not even clear whether it could be shut down and then restarted again
because the friction caused by the movement of oil through the pipe may be the only thing that
keeps the oil warm enough to flow, particularly in the winter. See Robert Gramling & William R.
Freudenburg, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in the Context of U.S. Petroleum Politics, INDUS. CRISIS
Q. 6 (1992), reprinted in PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 71, 80-81.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SUBSTANTIVE CONTEXT

69

The first lawsuit was filed in less than a week.33
B.

Civil Procedure Illustrated in the Exxon Valdez Cases

The following sections examine the various procedural topics that arose
during the thirteen years (and counting) of the Exxon Valdez litigation.
1.

Parties and Joinder

Hundreds of cases were filed in Alaskan state court and the federal district
court against Exxon34 and Alyeska, a company owned by six oil companies,35
which “owne[d] and operate[d] the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System and the
Valdez oil terminal at which the Exxon Valdez had been loaded.”36 It is helpful
at this point to list all the potential plaintiffs. (As discussed below, it is also
helpful to note that some persons sued in their individual capacity, while others
sued as representatives of various classes.) The plaintiffs included fishermen,
area businesses—those directly related to the fishing industry and otherwise—
Alaskan Natives, land owners, the State of Alaska, the United States and
environmental groups acting on behalf of the general public.37
Here, then, in summary form are the various plaintiffs and the disposition
of their cases, as the students will be asked to develop them for me:
1. The United States – The United States filed an action for injury to the
environment, which settled for at least $900 million (with the State of
Alaska).38 This settlement also included resolution of the potential criminal
actions, which could have resulted in billion dollar fines, for a fine of $150
million, of which $125 million was remitted for Exxon’s prior clean-up
expenses and cooperation.

33. Sheila Toomey, 2 Fishermen File First Lawsuit Over Spill; More Suits Likely,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, March 30, 1989, at C1, available at http://www.adn.com/evos/
stories/EV337.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002). Martin and James Goreson initiated a class
action suit in Anchorage Superior Court against Exxon, Alyeska and the State Department of
Environmental Conservation for gross negligence in both the spill and the botched cleanup
efforts. Id.
34. For brevity and convenience, whenever I mention Exxon, I am referring to Exxon
Corporation, Exxon Shipping Company, Exxon Transportation Company and individual and
former Exxon employee/defendants, unless otherwise indicated. See, e.g., Eyak Native Vill. v.
Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 774 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1002 (1995).
35. The owners (with percentile interests in parentheses) were BP Exploration (50.01%),
ARCO Pipeline Co. (21.35%), Exxon Pipeline Co. (20.34%), Mobil Alaska Pipeline Co. (4.08%),
Amerada Hess Pipeline Co. (1.5%), Phillips Alaska Pipeline Co. (1.36%) and Union Alaska
Pipeline Co. (1.36%). These six companies also own the pipeline itself.
36. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 775.
37. Id. at 774-75.
38. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).
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2. The State of Alaska – Alaska filed an action in Alaska state court for
injury to the environment,39 as well as in federal court, and settled for at least
$900 million (with the United States).40
3. Commercial fisherman41 – Commercial fishermen numbered about
10,000 and were represented by some eighty law firms and would have
received about $2.9 billion of the $5 billion punitive damages verdict that is
now set to be reduced on remand.42
4. Alaskan Natives43 – The claims process for Alaskan Natives represented
a complicated mix of state and federal law, as well as unique federal law
applicable only to the natives,44 in particular the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (“ANCSA”),45 section 8301 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,46
and factual complications caused by the subsistence lifestyle of many of the
Natives.47 When the spill drifted onto lands owned by three Alaskan Native
Corporations—Chenega Corporation, Port Graham Corporation, and English
Bay Corporation (“Corporations”)—they filed suit against Exxon and Alyeska,
alleging not only damage to their lands but also damage to archeological sites
and artifacts.48 Prior to trial, Alyeska settled for $5,689,079 and the
Corporations sought and received damages from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Liability Fund (“TAPL”) in the amount of $23,266,884.49 The Corporations
and Exxon ultimately went to trial and a jury awarded the Corporations nearly
$6 million, although the story is far more complicated than that.50 A separate
class action involving 3,455 individual Natives is discussed below.51

39. Alaska Sues Exxon, Pipeline Consortium for Oil Spill Damages, Restoration Order, 20
Env’t Rep. (BNA) 691 (Aug. 18, 1989). The action was filed as State v. Exxon Corp., No. 3AN89-6852 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1989). Id.
40. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1223; see discussion supra text accompanying note
38.
41. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 775.
42. Spillionaires, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, March 17, 1996, at B3, available at
http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV402.html (last visited August 30, 2002).
43. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 774-75. See generally Quam, supra note 9.
44. See Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1999).
45. Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(f) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
Discussed infra note 159-60 and accompanying text.
46. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 43 U.S.C. § 1642 (1994).
47. See Quam, supra note 9, at 178-81 and sources cited therein for a discussion of
subsistence living as a social and cultural way of life rather than just as hunting and fishing. See
also infra note 161.
48. Chenega Corp., 991 P.2d at 774.
49. Id. at 775.
50. Id. As noted, the lands that were damaged were lands given to Native Corporations
under ANCSA. Other lands that were injured by the spill had been selected by the Corporations
for acquisition, but because of the slow process involved, were still titled to the federal
government. Section 8301 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 gave the Native Corporations the
right to sue for damages to these lands that had been selected by the Corporations but not yet
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5. Fish processors52 – There were about thirty-five commercial seafood
processors who lost money as a result of the spill, not including the Seattle
Seven,53 and they would have been entitled to $80 million of the punitive
damage award.54
6. Employees of fish processors55 – Some 5,000 cannery workers were
affected and would have taken $20 million of the punitive damages.56
7. Area businesses57 – Affected businesses included such diverse entities
as seafood brokers, sportfishing lodges and net menders; less than 200 of these
entities would have been eligible for $10 million of the punitive damages
award.58
8. Land owners59 – There were 2.3 million acres of real estate affected, not
including government land, some of which was owned by twenty Native
Corporations.60
9. Environmental organizations – The “trust plaintiffs,” so designated by
the federal court, included the National Wildlife Federation, the Wildlife
Federation of Alaska, and the National Resources Defense Council, which
filed a complaint in National Wildlife Federation v. Exxon,61 and the Alaska
Sportfishing Association, which filed Alaska Sportfishing Association v.

titled to them. Id. at 774-75. The federal and state governments entered into a consent decree
which provided that their settlements would not include damages to these Native lands in 1991.
Id. at 775 n.4 (the action was filed as Native Vill. of Chenega Bay v. State, No. A91-454 Civ. (D.
Alaska Sept. 24, 2991)). In addition, the court dismissed the Corporations’ punitive damages
claim as a result of the federal court’s order creating a mandatory punitive damages class, as
discussed below. Chenega Corp., 991 P.2d at 775. The jury’s award of nearly $6 million was
offset against the Alyeska settlement and previously received TAPL payments by the lower court,
so the Corporations took nothing. Id. The state supreme court affirmed this decision after a
lengthy discussion of Alaska’s collateral source rule and after noting that TAPL had sued Exxon
for subrogation of its payment to the Corporations. Id. at 789-92. However, the lower court
failed to properly instruct the jury as to the Corporations’ right to sue for damages to lands they
had claimed but had not yet received title to. Id. at 781-88. Thus, this case ended in a remand for
retrial of that issue. Id. at 799.
51. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
52. Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1994).
53. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
54. Spillionaires, supra note 42.
55. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 775.
56. Spillionaires, supra note 42.
57. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 775.
58. Spillionaires, supra note 42.
59. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 775.
60. Spillionares, supra note 42.
61. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994). The
action was filed as National Wildlife Federation v. Exxon Corp., No. 3AN-89-6957 (Alaska
Super. Ct. 1989). Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

72

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:63

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.62 The four groups then sought a conservation
trust fund class to include “all persons whose use, enjoyment, aesthetic and
environmental interests in the protection and enhancement of the ecosystem,
wildlife and other natural resources of Prince William Sound” were damaged.63
These interests were deemed separate from the already certified commercial
and subsistence use classes.
A month after the four plaintiffs filed for class certification, the United
States and Alaska reached their settlement, which included payment for natural
resource damages. The plaintiffs, thereafter, argued that the consent judgment
was not binding on them since the State had a conflict of interest in negotiating
the settlement and that the damage amount, negotiated in secret, did not
contain adequate funds to cure the environmental damages. Exxon then
removed all cases involving the environmental claims, including National
Wildlife Federation v. Exxon, Eyak Native Village v. Exxon and Wisner v.
Exxon64 to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).65 The trust plaintiffs
sought remand to state court, but the District Court found a sufficient federal
question to satisfy section 1441(a) in the form of either an action in equity or a
motion under Rule 60(b)(3).66 The Ninth Circuit upheld the removals, but on
different grounds.67
10. Fifteen class actions originally filed in Alaska state court68 – With the
exception of the Alaska Sportfishing Association, which joined with three
other groups described above as the trust plaintiffs, these plaintiffs were
removed to federal court pursuant to section 1441(c). In 1989, the classes filed
a consolidated complaint seeking to consolidate into five new classes,
discussed immediately below.69
11. The consolidated classes – In 1991, the federal district court certified
four classes, the Alaska Native Class, Commercial Fishing Class,
Processor/Distributor Class and Area Business Class, and denied a Use and
Enjoyment Class.70
62. Id. The action was filed as Alaska Sportfishing Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv., No.
3AN-89-5188 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1989). Id.
63. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 776.
64. Id. This action was filed as Wisner v. Exxon Corp., No. 3KO-89-265 (Alaska Super. Ct.
1989). Id.
65. Id.
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) (party may be relieved from a final judgment or order where it
has been reached due to fraud).
67. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 779.
68. The Eyak Native Village, Cordova District Fishermen United, Prince William Sound
Setnetters Association, Philip McCrudden, Samish Maritime, Inc., Randall Babich, Albert
Carroll, Ina Thorne, Edward Gregorieff, Kent Herschleb, Mark Van Driessche, Keith Gordaoff,
Tom Copeland, Sea Hawk Seafoods and the Alaska Sportfishing Association. Id. at 779-80.
69. Id. at 780.
70. Id.
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12. The Wisner v. Exxon Corporation class – Originally a separate class,
these plaintiffs became part of the consolidated classes above.71
13. The “Seattle Seven”72 – Immediately after the spill, a group of private
companies which process seafood caught in Prince William Sound settled with
Exxon for $64 million. It was a bit more complicated than that, however, as
discussed below.73
14. The Mandatory Damages Class – Judge H. Russel Holland of the
District Court for the Federal District of Alaska certified a mandatory punitive
damages class in 1994. Alaska’s state courts agreed that this class was the
only mechanism through which any plaintiff in any court could recover
punitive damages.74
Even California motorists who claimed injury due to increased gasoline
prices sought to get into the act.75 The action was brought as a class action in
Alaska, properly removed under section 1441(b)76 to federal court because
jurisdiction was “founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States”77 because it invoked the strict liability
provisions of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (“TAPAA”), and
then was dismissed in the first 12(b)(6)78 motion, which my students will see.79
2.

Class Actions

The Exxon Valdez disaster hurt many people in many different ways, but
the injuries fell into a manageable number of different classes: commercial
fisherman, sport fishermen, subsistence hunters, etc. In addition to the many
individual suits, class actions were initiated under both state80 and federal
law,81 classes were removed,82 consolidated,83 dismissed84 and, finally, the
71. Id. at 781.
72. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000).
73. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769, 775 (Alaska 1999).
75. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 1992). This case also presents an
interesting proximate cause analysis for the torts professor: plaintiffs alleged that the spill caused
the Coast Guard to close the port of Valdez reducing the flow of oil to refineries, the refineries
decided to raise the price of oil rather than tap into reserves, wholesalers passed the increases
along to distributors, distributors passed it along to retailers and the retailers increased the price of
gas for plaintiffs! Id. at 807.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
77. Benefiel, 959 F.2d at 807 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)) (emphasis added).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted).
79. Benefiel, 959 F.2d at 806.
80. See supra note 68.
81. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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federal court created a single mandatory punitive damages class.85 Thus, there
are many opportunities to introduce the class action mechanism.
It is hard to deny the importance of class actions, and I will spend as much
time as I can spare on class action suits during the course of the semester.86
Class actions are, of course, controversial in some circles as well. Alleged
abuses of the class action process are driving a process that would force all
class actions into federal court.87 The proposed Class Action Fairness Act
would shift any class action to federal court where there was minimal diversity
and claims of more than $2 million—a small threshold amount in modern mass
tort actions. These reforms are before the Senate Judiciary Committee as this
is being written. What are the politics behind the Act? Who would benefit by
its passage and who would be hurt?
3.

Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Removal

Now is the time for an introduction to subject matter jurisdiction and Title
28 of the United States Code.88 For the cases originally filed in federal court,
jurisdiction is based on section 1333 for the maritime law claims,89 and section
133190 for the private remedy allowed under the TAPAA.91 Students should
also be able to parse through the Code to find provisions describing the United
States and Indian tribes as plaintiffs.92 The claims brought originally under
state law invite a look at the Code’s removal provision, section 1441.93
Further, in one instance, students must cross-reference between the general

85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86. I include class actions in my Civil Procedure class for the same reason that I try to
include, at least, a taste of products liability in my torts class. In both cases, I can only introduce
the subject, but encourage students to take upper level courses in the topic if I have whetted their
interests. For a casebook for upper level class action courses, see ROBERT H. KLONOFF &
EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION (2000).
87. John O’Brien, Group Seeks Reform of Class-action Lawsuits; Class Action Fairness
Coalition Wants All Cases to be Heard in Federal Court, THE POST-STANDARD, July 24, 2002, at
B3.
88. There are an array of supplements that include, inter alia, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and portions of Title 28. I use West’s FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(educational ed. 2002).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (admiralty, maritime and prize cases). This section is not seen
often in first year Civil Procedure cases.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (federal question jurisdiction).
91. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
92. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1362 (2000). As discussed below, only a portion of Alaska’s natives
are classified as Indians; however, for many federal law purposes they are accorded the same
rights and status. But see Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)
(lands held pursuant to ANCSA are not “Indian country” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b)).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (actions removable generally). See Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon
Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1994).
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removal provisions of section 1441 and the specifics of removal in section
1446.94
4.

Settlements and Alternative Dispute Resolution

The cases also provide the opportunity to discuss various settlement
mechanisms. The State of Alaska’s and the United States’ claims for injury to
natural resources under the Clean Water Act95 were resolved after Exxon
agreed to pay $900 million for environmental cleanup.96 Exxon also spent $2
billion on clean-up efforts and settled many claims for some $300 million.97
One settlement involving the “Seattle Seven” raised other issues that are
discussed in the Professional Responsibility section below.98
Exxon has just entered the “reopener” phase of the settlement; between
September 1, 2002 and September 1, 2006 Exxon can be called upon to pay up
to an additional $100 million for damages which were uncovered after the
agreement and which could not have been reasonably known or anticipated.99
5.

Venue and Forum Non Conveniens

Seariver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Pena100 is a fascinating case
that illustrates the concepts of venue, dismissal or transfer for improper venue,
and forum non conveniens in just a few pages.101 Recall that in September
1991, Exxon entered into a consent decree with the United States and the State
of Alaska, which stated, inter alia, first, that Exxon would not sue with respect
to any claims it might have arising out of the oil spill, and, second, that the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska retained jurisdiction for
any additional orders, relief or implementation of the agreement.102 Recall also
that prior to the settlement, in August 1990, President Bush signed into law the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, section 5007, which stated that no ship that had
previously spilled more than one million gallons of oil into the marine
94. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 782. The court did not reach the merits of Alyeska’s
attempts to remove a number of state claims to federal court because Alyeska’s notice of removal
was not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (requiring that notice of removal be filed within
30 days of receipt of a claim for relief upon which the removal is based).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (2000). Other federal environmental legislation was also implicated.
96. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 775.
97. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).
98. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
99. Agreement and Consent Decree at 18-19, available at http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us
(last visited July 22, 2002) (on file with author).
100. 952 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1997).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000) (venue generally); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000) (change of
venue); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000) (statutory forum non conveniens); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2000)
(cure or waiver of defects); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000) (dismissal or transfer for improper
venue).
102. Seariver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc., 952 F. Supp. at 9-10.
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environment could operate in Prince William Sound.103 Let the students
decide whether this seemed to be unfairly targeted at Exxon and, more
specifically, the Exxon Valdez.
By the way, where was the Exxon Valdez and who was Seariver? Exxon
Shipping had changed its name to Seariver Maritime, and the Exxon Valdez
had been renamed the S/R Mediterranean and was operating in the
Mediterranean Sea.104 Seariver brought suit when it wanted to bring the
former Exxon Valdez back to Prince William Sound to resume shipping oil
from the Valdez terminal of the Alaskan Pipeline to California.105 Here my
students get their first taste of constitutional analysis, as Exxon/Seariver
claimed that section 5007 violates no less than four constitutional
provisions:106 due process,107 double jeopardy,108 Bill of Attainder109 and ex
post facto laws.110
The substantive issue of the case was whether the consent decree, signed
after the Oil Pollution Act was signed into law, constituted a waiver of these
constitutional claims.111 However, we are more interested in the venue and
forum non conveniens issues. Exxon/Seariver first filed the case in the
Southern District of Texas and the Texas court ruled that venue was not proper
in Texas, but would be proper in either the District of Columbia or Alaska.
The Texas court first dismissed the case—after which the plaintiff refiled in
the District of Columbia—then reconsidered and transferred to the District of
Columbia, holding that venue was proper there under section 1391(e).112 Next,
the United States moved for a transfer to Alaska pursuant to section 1406(a).113
103. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 5007, 33 U.S.C. § 2737 (2000).
104. Seariver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc., 952 F. Supp. at 10. Exxon officials denied the name
change had anything to do with the Alaskan disaster. KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 298. As far as I
know, Hazelwood has not changed his name. According to most recent reports, Hazelwood has
paid his $50,000 restitution to Alaska, completed his community service requirements in Alaska
(ironically the appeals process continued until after the clean-up ended, so he did not get to
participate therein) and is attending AA meetings. Valdez Captain Pays His Debt, CHI. TRIB.,
May 17, 2002, at 18, available at 2002 WL 2655863.
105. Seariver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc., 952 F. Supp. at 10.
106. Id.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V (Due Process Clause). Students will, of course, spend a great
deal of time on Due Process, primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment in the personal
jurisdiction cases.
108. Id. (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb. . . .”).
109. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 43 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
110. Id.
111. Seariver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc., 952 F. Supp. at 10.
112. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2000) (proper venue where the defendant is the United
States)).
113. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000) (court may dismiss case or transfer to proper
venue when case is filed in the wrong venue)).
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However, because the Texas court had already held that the District was a
proper venue, the District of Columbia court determined that it would transfer
to Alaska not under section 1406(a), but rather on the basis of forum non
conveniens.114 The court then gave a clear and brief explanation of the concept
of transfer “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice,”115 a concept we will explore in more detail later in the course.116
6.

Discovery

As should be obvious, a complex mass tort case, such as this one,
involving many people and a great deal of money required extensive
discovery, but discovery is a topic about which students have probably given
little thought prior to law school. In fact, discovery took almost five years; the
defendants were required to produce millions of pages of materials; the
plaintiffs took over one thousand depositions; Exxon deposed thousands of
individuals and required them to produce tax records and other business
records; and Exxon employed hundreds of expert witnesses, most of whom
produced expert reports and most of whom were deposed by the plaintiffs.117
There are obviously many examples of the discovery process available in
connection with these cases. For example, in In re The Exxon Valdez,118 the
plaintiffs sought documents from the American Petroleum Institute (“API”), a
Washington trade association, through a non-party subpoena. API resisted,
arguing, inter alia, that the then-new Rule 45(c)119 required that the petitioners
bear the cost of compliance. Here students need to not only read the Rule, but
114. Id. (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000)).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
116. The Cound text includes Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (where plane
crash occurred over Scotland, dismissal of case in Pennsylvania was proper even where transfer
would result in substantive law less favorable to plaintiffs) and a brief excerpt from Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (even where venue is proper, a court may decline
jurisdiction based upon a balancing test which weighs all factors, but granting plaintiff’s choice
unless balance is strongly against that decision), which I supplement with my own cut-down
version of In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987),
another disaster case resulting from 2,000 deaths and 200,000 injuries from a release of cyanide
gas in Bhopal, India, and which ultimately concluded with a $470,000,000 settlement, and
involved forum non conveniens analysis on an international scale.
117. William B. Hirsch, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Justice Delayed: Seven Years Later and
No End in Sight, in PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 271-308, available at
http://www.lieffcabraser.com/wbh_exxart.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2002). This is the website of
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, where Hirsch is of counsel. Lieff Cabraser is a multistate firm that litigates, inter alia, plaintiffs’ side class action and mass toxic tort cases. The
article, which generally takes a critical attitude toward Exxon’s handling of the situation, is
recommended for its inside analysis of the legal maneuvering behind the decision-making
involved in settlements, removals and delaying tactics.
118. 142 F.R.D. 380 (D.D.C. 1992).
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c) (as amended in 1991).
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also to parse through the Advisory Committee’s Notes, hopefully finding the
sentence that states: “A non-party required to produce documents or materials
is protected against significant expense resulting from involuntary assistance to
the court.”120
Adding to the confusion, API also argued that because the majority of the
documents sought by the plaintiffs could also be obtained from the defendants,
production should be shifted to them because it would be “more convenient,
less burdensome, or less expensive,” citing Rule 26(b)(1).121 If a student has
done as she should and looked up the Rule she will not find that quote in Rule
26(b)(1), but rather in Rule 26(b)(2)(i) where it was moved in a 1993
amendment.122 The court held that because API was the industry-wide
repository for safety information, API and its members had an actual interest in
the litigation, twenty-nine percent of its income came from In re The Exxon
Valdez defendants, and that because it had 1989 gross receipts of $58 million
and a net worth of $17 million, API should bear twenty-nine percent of the
costs of production.123 Interestingly, API may have actively lobbied in
Washington against the double-hulled tanker requirements (which were finally
enacted into law as a result of the spill) and oil spill contingency plans.124
7.

The Role of the Jury

I want my students to understand our legal system’s love-hate relationship
with the jury. From Blackstone’s “glory of the English law,”125 to increasing
criticisms such as Chief Justice Burger’s 1985 article, Thinking the

120. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note.
121. In re The Exxon Valdez, 142 F.R.D. at 382 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (as amended
in 1987, not reflecting 1993 amendments)).
122. The Advisory Committee’s Notes report that, “[t]he information explosion of recent
decades has greatly increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential
for discovery to be used as an instrument of delay and oppression.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory
committee’s note.
123. In re The Exxon Valdez, 142 F.R.D. at 382-84.
124. Id. at 384. However, API argued that these lobbying efforts were privileged as protected
by the First Amendment right to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
(citing U. S. CONST. amend. I). This issue was not reached, as it was pending in the Alaskan
court at the time of this hearing. Id. at 384-85.
125. Professor Cound cites this quote in his introductory materials to the chapter on trials.
See COUND ET AL., supra note 2, at 953. Blackstone, after discussing the jury trial, stated:
Upon these accounts the trial by jury has ever been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon
as the glory of the English law. And, if it has so great an advantage over others in
regulating civil property, how much must that advantage be heightened, when it is applied
to criminal cases!
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379.
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Unthinkable,126 the proper role of the jury has prompted a great deal of debate.
No one topic illustrates the debate better than the setting aside of allegedly
excessive jury awards, such as the five billion dollars assessed against Exxon,
which led to the Ninth Circuit’s reversal and remand in In re The Exxon
Valdez.127 The case, the most recent in the Exxon Valdez line of cases as this is
being written, was announced just after I had taught BMW v. Gore in a torts
class128 and became the basis of a final exam question in torts. The Exxon
Valdez tragedy occurred before BMW, and the Ninth Circuit examined the
punitive damages issue in In re The Exxon Valdez after BMW and after the
Ninth Circuit had been reversed by the Supreme Court in a recent case which
reaffirmed BMW, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.129
The punitive damage award against Exxon ($5,000 in punitive damages
were also assessed against Captain Hazelwood) was, at the time, the largest
punitive damages award in history.130 But was it unreasonable? Because the
jury apparently selected an amount equal to Exxon’s annual net profit

126. COUND ET AL., supra note 2, at 954-55 (quoting Warren E. Burger, Thinking the
Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205, 210-11 (1985) (listing problems associated with civil jury
trials)).
127. 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001).
128. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In BMW, the car manufacturer had a policy that if pre-sale
damages to a new car amounted to less than 3% of the car’s value, it would repair the car and sell
it as new without disclosure of the damage and repair to the retail dealer, and, thus, the consumer.
Id. at 563-64. This was in keeping with the consumer laws of some twenty-five states. Id. at 565.
Dr. Gore bought a BMW that had been repainted after acid rain damaged it in transit from
Germany. This was a $600 cost, 1.5% of the vehicle’s price, and, thus, not disclosed. When he
took the car to Slick Finish for detailing, Mr. Slick detected that it had been repainted. Id. at 567.
Gore sued, winning a seemingly reasonable jury verdict of $4,000 in compensatory damages.
However, the jury then awarded $4 million in punitive damages. The Alabama Supreme Court
reduced the punitives to $2 million. The Supreme Court held that due process requires that a
person must have fair notice of conduct that will subject him to punishment as well as notice of
the possible severity of the punishment. Id. at 574. Thus, a grossly excessive punitive damage
award violates due process. Whether an award is grossly excessive is based on three factors: the
degree of reprehensibility (violence versus economic harm, non-disclosure versus deliberate false
statements); the ratio of actual damages to punitive damages (double, triple or quadruple damages
were seen in the early English cases originating the concept, but in BMW the ratio was 500/1);
and sanctions for similar misconduct (here the civil penalty authorized by the legislature was
capped at $2,000). Id. at 575. On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered a remittitur of
$50,000 and Gore accepted. See VICTOR SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S
TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 554-61, 561, n.1 (10th ed. 2000).
129. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). In Leatherman, the Court held that the appellate court should
conduct a de novo review of a jury’s award of punitive damages. The level of punitive damages
was not really a fact tried by the jury, because the appellate court was more institutionally
competent to make the decision and, thus, taking the issue from the jury did not violate the
Seventh Amendment. Id. at 436-437.
130. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1238.
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worldwide, believing a year without profit to be an appropriate punishment,131
students may differ on the answer to that question. As the Ninth Circuit noted,
when the jury returned its verdict, neither BMW nor Leatherman had been
decided, and, thus, the court had no constitutional analysis by the District
Court to review.132 Thus, the court remanded, but not before providing
analysis of the three BMW factors.133 Although it did not give specifics, the
court determined that the $5 billion amount was too high to withstand
scrutiny.134
8.

The Trial

The trial lasted four and a half months.135 The District Court tried the case
in three phases. In the first phase, the jury found that Exxon and Hazelwood
had been reckless and, thus, both were liable for punitive damages.136 In the
second phase, the jury found that two classes, the Commercial Fishing Class
and the Native Class, were entitled to compensatory damages of $287
million.137 In the third phase, the $5 billion punitive damage award that was
later reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit was awarded.138 There was
to be a fourth phase involving landowners and other fisherman not included in
the class, but those groups settled before the trial.139
9.

The Appeals Process

The Exxon Valdez cases are nothing if not illustrative of the potential for a
never-ending string of appeals in the American legal system. There are
numerous opportunities to explain the appeals process. For example, after the
decision in In re The Exxon Valdez,140 which was decided by a three-judge
panel that included a replacement for one judge who had heard the oral

131. Id. at 1238-39.
132. Id. at 1241.
133. Id. at 1241-46.
134. Id. at 1246-47.
135. Hirsch, supra note 117, at 284.
136. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225. The decision came after four weeks of
testimony centering on Hazelwood’s degree of intoxication at the time of the accident and
Exxon’s knowledge of his drinking problem. See Natalie Phillips, Jury Finds Exxon, Hazelwood
Reckless, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 14, 1994, at A1,
available at
http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV388.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
137. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225. The court reduced this award to a little over
$19.5 million for released claims, settlements and payments from the TAPL fund. Id. The
plaintiffs had sought $1.5 billion. Phillips, supra note 136, at A1.
138. In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225.
139. Id.
140. 270 F.3d 1215.
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arguments, but died before the case was decided,141 the plaintiffs sought
rehearing en banc, but were denied.142 Should the then-biggest punitive
damages award in U.S. history have been evaluated by the full Ninth Circuit?
C. Two Collateral Issues: Professional Responsibility and Indigenous
Peoples
The following two topics are not Civil Procedure per se, but, in the first
instance, I believe it is important to introduce professional responsibility issues
throughout the curriculum, and, in the second, I believe the use of indigenous
peoples law helps students understand the underlying cultural and ethical
assumptions of Western law. Environmental law is an obvious third collateral
topic; it cannot help but diffuse throughout the discussion of the cases, but I do
not discuss it separately.
1.

Professional Responsibility

Most would agree that professional responsibility issues need to be
addressed from time to time throughout the curriculum, not just in the course
of that name.143 The Exxon Valdez cases provide an interesting opportunity.
Recall that the “Seattle Seven” seafood packers had settled early on with
Exxon for $64 million. This fact was known at the time of the district court
trial for the mandatory punitive damages class, but what Exxon’s attorneys did
not disclose to the court, the other plaintiffs or the jury, was that the “Seattle
Seven” had agreed not to take any compensatory damages awarded them and
to pay or “cede” back to Exxon any punitive damages awarded to the “Seattle
Seven.”144 Exxon’s President stated on the witness stand that Exxon had paid
out over $300 million to injured parties and had received “nothing of value in
return.” Exxon’s attorney reiterated this point in his closing remarks. In fact,
due to the agreement with the “Seattle Seven” and others like it, Exxon
received about $168 million of value in return.145
Students are asked if they consider this unethical.146 In an unreported
district court opinion, the court held that the cede back agreement was not

141. Id. at 1220, n.*. Judge Wiggins heard the oral arguments on May 3, 1999, but died on
March 2, 2000. Judge Schroeder replaced him and listened to a tape of the oral argument. Id.
142. See Ninth Circuit Denies Appeal for Exxon Valdez Punitive Damage Rehearing,
PETROLEUM NEWS ALASKA, Jan. 11, 2002, available at http://www.petroleumnewsalaska.com/
nbarch/08-5-2.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
143. See DEBORAH RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD 429-58 (2d ed. 1998).
144. In re The Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2000). The agreement was later
modified to allow the “Seattle Seven” to keep a portion of the punitive damages. Id.
145. Id. at 794.
146. Judge Holland, the trial court judge, was not pleased, stating:
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unethical, but the “Seattle Seven” were not permitted to receive any of the
damages awarded, and “[t]he court had no doubt that the Exxon Valdez jury
would be outraged if Exxon, through the Seattle Seven settlement agreement,
rather than the claimants, were to wind up with almost 15% of the punitive
damages award.”147
However, the Ninth Circuit held that, in light of the twin goals of reaching
settlements and maintaining fairness to all parties in mass tort class action
litigation, cede back agreements are fair and appropriate.148 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with Exxon that, as a general rule, juries should not
generally be told of cede back agreements because they would tend to offset
them by increasing the amount of the damage award.149 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit decided that there were not special circumstances that warranted not
following the general rule.150 Thus, although the court did “not condone its
conduct,” Exxon was not penalized, and the court felt it unfair to exclude the
“Seattle Seven” from the settlement based upon Exxon’s conduct.151 What
could Exxon have done differently? At the very least, fully disclose the
agreements to the judge away from the jury.
2.

Indigenous Peoples

The land and the water are our sources of life. The water is sacred. The water
is like a baptismal font, and its abundance is the Holy Communion of our lives.
Of all the things that we have lost since non-Natives came to our land, we have
never lost our connection to the water. The water is our source of life. So long
as the water is alive, the Chugach Natives are alive.152

In all of my classes, I like to include references to issues raised by
indigenous peoples from time to time, not necessarily to teach, for example,
Indian law153 for its own sake, but to help explicate the underlying cultural and
The court is shocked and disappointed that Exxon entered into such a repugnant
agreement with the Seattle Seven. Although the court does not so find, it is probable that
more than one of the many attorneys who represent Exxon and the Seattle Seven violated
Rule 3.3 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct requiring candor toward the
tribunal.
KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 326 (quoting an unreported district court opinion).
147. In re The Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d at 794-95 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 795-96.
149. Id. at 797. Students may be surprised by this statement, “a jury should assess damages
but not determine how much defendants should ‘actually’ pay or how much plaintiffs should
‘actually’ receive.” Id.
150. Id. at 800.
151. Id.
152. KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 231 (quoting Chugach Village Chief Walter Meganack).
153. Unlike those of the lower forty-eight states, the indigenous peoples of Alaska are most
often referred to as Alaska Natives or simply Natives. For a discussion of the propriety of the
term “Indian” versus “Native American,” see JAMES WILSON, THE EARTH SHALL WEEP: A
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ethical assumptions of our Western law through a comparative look at how a
different culture looks at concepts such as individual property ownership.154
A brief bit of Alaskan Native history is in order. When the United States
purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, the treaty provided that all inhabitants
who wished to remain would be entitled to the rights of citizenship with the
exception of the “uncivilized native tribes.”155 Thus began a period in which
little attention was paid to the subsistence-living Natives’ land rights, and there
was much less pressure to extinguish the Natives’ aboriginal title than in the
lower forty-eight states.156 However, the Supreme Court did hold in 1955 that
Native land interests could be extinguished without compensation by the
federal government.157
The discovery of oil on the North Slope changed everything.158 After
many years of political debate at the state and federal levels regarding Native
land rights in Alaska following the discovery of valuable oil deposits on the
Alaskan North Slope and after development of the controversial Trans-Alaska
Pipeline plan—necessitated by the fact that the Beaufort Sea adjacent to the oil
fields was impassible much of the year but Valdez was passable twelve months
HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICA at XV (1998) (discussing the difficulties in arriving at the proper
terms for use in describing the indigenous peoples of North America). In fact, applying Western
ethnological terminology, many of Alaska’s Natives are not Indians. The Alaskan peninsula and
the Aleutian Islands are inhabited by Aleuts; Western and northern Alaska are inhabited by Yupik
and Inupiat Eskimos; Tlingit and Haida Indians live in southeastern Alaska; and, finally,
Athabascan Indians live in the interior. See DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 906 (4th ed. 1998). The Natives of the Prince William Sound area are a
mixture of many Native groups with the Alutiiq the dominant group. Duane Gill & J. Steven
Picou, The Day the Water Died Cultural Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, reprinted in
PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 168.
154. The Tulsa Law Review recently devoted an entire issue to an excellent series of articles
on integrating Indian Law into law school curricula. Melissa Tatum, Foreword, 37 TULSA L.
REV. 481 (2001); Cynthia Ford, Including Indian Law in a Traditional Civil Procedure Course: A
Reprise, Five Years Later, 37 TULSA L. REV. 485 (2001). See also Cynthia Ford, Integrating
Indian Law in a Traditional Civil Procedure Course, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243 (1996). I have
elsewhere discussed my use of Indian Law in Property. See Keith Sealing, Dear Landlord,
Please Don’t Put a Price on my Soul: Teaching Property Law Students That “Property Rights
Serve Human Values,” 5 N.Y. CITY L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at notes 138-73, on file
with author).
155. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 367 (3d ed. 1998)
(quoting Treaty of Cession, 15 Stat. 539, 542).
156. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 153, at 906.
157. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
158. ARCO and Humble (now Exxon) discovered significant amounts of oil and natural gas
at Prudhoe Bay on the north shore of Alaska in January of 1968. By July, they announced the
find to be 9.6 billion barrels (small oil finds had been discovered as early as the beginning of the
19th century by the Russians). Robert Gramling & William Freudenburg, The Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill in the Context of U.S. Petroleum Politics, INDUS. CRISIS Q. 6 (1992), reprinted in PICOU ET
AL., supra note 1, at 76-77.
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a year—the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was passed in December,
1971.159 Although purporting to grant Natives land rights, it was clearly
designed to remove legal obstacles to construction of the Trans-Alaska Oil
Pipeline.160 Native claims to some 365 million acres of land were extinguished
in exchange for the right to select 44 million acres and receive payments of
$962.5 million. It placed title to all Native lands in the hands of Tribal
Corporations with shares therein held by individual members of the tribes.
After 1991, Corporations could sell their interests to developers.
As already noted, the disaster had a severe impact on the Native
population, particularly those living a subsistence lifestyle.161 Humans have
existed in the Prince William Sound area for at least 7,000 years and those
affected by the spill numbered about 15,200. Subsistence harvests dropped by
about seventy-seven percent immediately after the spill and had not yet fully
recovered according to a tenth anniversary study.162 But how does one put a
price on subsistence losses? For some 3,500 Natives the answer was $20
million or about $4,000 each.163
But the Natives’ path through the courts involved them in a system not of
their own making or choosing. For a separate class of 3,455 Natives, a
settlement was reached for damages to their subsistence harvest, but their
attempt to recover for damages to their subsistence lifestyle or culture was
rebuffed by the court.164 The class presented two claims, one for cultural
damage and one for harvest damage.165 When the class settled on the harvest
damage claim, Exxon moved for summary judgment on the cultural claim.166
The decision hinged on whether the class had stated a public nuisance under
federal maritime law, which, in turn, hinged on the “special injury law,” which

159. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (2000).
160. See KEEBLE, supra note 13, at 10-11; GETCHES ET AL., supra note 153, at 907-12;
CANBY, supra note 155, at 372-79.
161. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. Subsistence means
noncommercial, customary and traditional uses of fish, game, and wild plants for food,
fuel, tools, clothing, handicrafts, and sharing. It is a vital component of the economy in
rural Alaska and provides a means for passing on cultural values, traditional knowledge,
and key survival skills from one generation to the next. In short, subsistence supports a
distinctive, vibrant way of life.
James A. Fall, Subsistence, RESTORATION NOTEBOOK, Sept. 1999, at 1, available at
http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
162. Fall, supra note 161.
163. Phillips, supra note 136, at A1.
164. Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997). The class originally
filed suit in state court and included the Native villages and government entities. Exxon removed
the action to federal court. Later, the villages and other entities were excluded, leaving the 3,455
individual Natives. Id. at 1197-98.
165. Id. at 1197.
166. Id.
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states that a private individual cannot recover damages for a public nuisance
unless she can show a special injury different in kind from that of the general
public.167 The district court held, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that “the right
to lead subsistence lifestyles is not limited to Alaska Natives,” and so they
suffered no special injury.168
III. CONCLUSION
The Exxon Valdez cases are still very relevant today not just because the $5
billion punitive damages award is currently on remand to the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska. For the second time, a Bush
Administration is pushing for legislation to permit oil exploration in the Alaska
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.169 The Exxon Valdez disaster played a large
role in the scuttling of the first Bush attempt to open up ANWR, and although
the new Bush proposal is blocked in the Senate as of this writing, “the issue is
not going to go away.”170 The western slope fields will eventually dry up and
ANWR oil—possibly as many as 16 billion barrels—could then be diverted to
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and its utility extended.171 While the new Bush
argues that OPA, signed into law by the old Bush in 1990, would protect the
environment,172 environmentalists still point to the Exxon Valdez disaster and
argue that another disaster is not just possible, but inevitable. Was the spill an
aberration caused by a drunken Captain or the inevitable result of attempting to
move so much oil through a narrow, dangerous and ecologically sensitive
passage while cutting costs wherever possible? Has post-spill legislation, such
as that mandating double-hulled vessels eliminated the dangers? Exxon Valdez
will be with us for some time to come; perhaps the oil company official who

167. Id.
168. Id. at 1198. The court concluded:
While the oil spill may have affected Alaska Natives more severely than other members
of the public, “the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and
cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychological benefits in pristine natural
surroundings” is shared by all Alaskans.
Id. (quoting District Court Order No. 150 at 6). For a more complete look at the case in a wellwritten student note, see Panoff, supra note 9.
169. See Browne Lewis, It’s Been 4380 Days and Counting Since Exxon Valdez: Is It Time To
Change The Oil Polution Act of 1990?, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (2001).
170. Walter Hickel, ANWR Oil: An Alternative to War Over Oil, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE,
June 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8328146. Hickel, former United States Secretary of the
Interior and two-term Alaska Governor, notes that the area could produce 600,000 to 1,900,000
barrels of oil per day, but does not mention that this oil would flow to Valdez and then through
Prince William Sound. Id.
171. Robert Gramling & William Freudenburg, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in the Context of
U.S. Petroleum Politics, reprinted in PICOU ET AL., supra note 1, at 82.
172. Lewis, supra note 169, at 31 (citing Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing
H.R. 1465, 1990 U.S.C.A.N. 861-1).
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suggested that lawyers not yet born would work on the case was not engaging
in hyperbole at all.173
In the course of working through the Exxon Valdez cases, students will
have developed an appreciation of the fact that they must read a case with their
rules supplement at their side and will have looked at a number of specific
Rules and how they interact,174 Advisory Committee Notes and history of the
Rules,175 provisions of Title 28 of the Code,176 the Constitution,177 and a
variety of other federal statutes. But, more importantly, they will have learned
that procedure is not an esoteric, dry sidelight to the real litigation, but rather a
vibrant and essential part of the law with very real impact on people, their lives
and their environment.

173. See supra text accompanying note 1.
174. FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 1-279 (rev. ed. 2002). Rules
discussed include 12(b)(6); old 26(b) and new 26(b)(1); 46(c); and 60(b)(3).
175. Id. Notes discussed include the Note to the 1991 amendments, see supra note 120, and
Note to the 1993 amendments, see supra note 122.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1-4001 as amended through Pub. L. 107-182, reprinted in FEDERAL CIVIL
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 571-1080 (rev. ed. 2002). Code sections discussed include 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333, 1345, 1362, 1391, 1404, 1406, 1441(a)-(c).
177. U. S. CONST., reprinted in FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES, 10881105 (rev. ed. 2002). Sections and amendments discussed include U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4,
supra note 108; U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. V.

